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Abstract:	In	recent	media	and	political	theory	the	idea	of	affective	solidarity	has	been	treated	as	a	contradiction	in	terms.	Any	relation	to	the	other	consisting	in	sympathy	or	pity	cannot	form	the	basis	of	full	subjective	recognition	of	the	other,	and	in	practice	is	often	actively	dehumanising.	Further,	there	remains	the	notion	that	solidarity	is	contingent	upon	a	rupture	of	habitual	being-in-the-world	 that	 produces	 a	 revelatory	 consciousness	 of	 the	 subjectivity	 of	 the	 other.	 In	journalistic	 contexts	 this	 leads	 to	practices	 that	aim	at	 intensive	or	extensive	encounters	 that	transcend	the	affective	livedness	of	everyday	routines.	Against	these	conventional	wisdoms,	this	article	 argues	 that	 solidarity	 with	 distant	 others	 is	 not	 clinched	 in	 spite	 of	 the	 merely	 felt	experience	of	the	other	in	everyday	life	–	an	experience	characterised	by	distraction,	ambivalence	and	 unreflexive	 sentimentality	 –	 but	 instead	 is	 predicated	 precisely	 on	 that	 mere	 feltness.	Drawing	 on	 Heidegger’s	 notion	 of	 findingness,	 Withy’s	 disclosive	 postures	 and	 Levinas’s	ascription	of	ethics	to	the	fundamental	priority	of	co-existence,	it	is	proposed	that	feeling	the	right	way	about	distant	suffering	may	be	immaterial.	In	practical	terms,	it	concludes	with	a	call	to	shift	our	empirical	focus	away	from	the	question	of	how	media	can	produce	meaningfully	solidaristic	encounters	between	distant	others,	to	ask	instead	what	kinds	of	ordinary	mediated	affect	already	existing	in	the	world	might	afford	solidarity.			
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Affective	solidarity	and	mediated	distant	suffering:	
In	defence	of	mere	feltness	
	
	
Introduction		Intuitively,	solidarity	is	a	straightforward	concept	to	understand:	a	standing	with	others	based	upon	the	recognition	of	 the	common	experience	of	humanity.	 It	 implies	a	willingness	 to	 incur	personal	costs	in	acting	in	common	or	on	behalf	of	the	other,	an	avowal	that	your	pain	is	my	pain,	your	battles	are	my	battles.	However,	phenomenological	perspectives	on	 the	way	we	come	to	know	 others	 present	 a	 fundamental	 dilemma.	 In	 short,	 all	 intentive	 consciousness,	 which	underpins	knowledge	of	and	understanding	of	others,	seeks	to	make	that	other	identical	to	itself.	Knowledge	 is	predicated	on	 the	obliteration	of	difference,	 and	 in	 this	 consists	 the	violence	of	making	an	other	your	phenomenological	object;	in	the	words	of	Emmanuel	Levinas,	“[o]ne	does	not	see	that	the	success	of	knowledge	would	in	fact	destroy	the	nearness,	the	proximity,	of	the	other”	(1996:	103-4).	This	applies	to	all	directed	consciousness,	the	drily	actuarial	as	much	as	the	insatiably	curious,	but	especially	to	the	sentimental.	In	making	an	other	the	object	of	one’s	pity,	one	does	not	so	much	take	on	their	suffering	as	one’s	own,	but	appropriates	it	for	selfish	ends	such	as	the	maintenance	of	one’s	self-image	as	a	good	humanitarian.	Further,	it	is	lazy,	responding	to	all	the	variegated	horrors	the	world	has	to	offer	in	much	the	same	way,	reacting	in	prescribed	ways	that	require	little	conscious	effort	rather	than	sizing	up	this	injustice	against	all	the	others	and	deciding	on	an	appropriate	course	of	action.		For	existentialists,	this	is	the	hell	of	other	people,	finding	ourselves	thrown	into	a	baffling	world	full	of	countless	others	we	can	never	hope	to	understand	fully,	yet	compelled	to	do	so	and	aware	that	there	are	only	bad	choices	to	make	in	making	others	sensible	to	us.	This	can	sound	like	a	call	to	wilful,	blissful	ignorance,	but	it	is	nothing	of	the	sort:	it	is	a	condition	of	thrownness	(Heidegger,	1962	[1927])	that	we	are	predisposed	to	try	to	make	sense	of	the	world.	Heidegger	takes	this	further	in	arguing	that	we	have	a	moral	duty	to	try	to	grasp	the	world	into	which	we	are	thrown	as	best	we	can,	including	taking	responsibility	for	the	complicit	self	that	appears	to	us	as	always-already	existing	 rather	 than	 something	we	have	 consciously	 carried	 to	 this	point	 in	 time	and	space.	I	may	find	the	world	bewildering	and	my	own	place	in	it	arbitrary,	but	I	can	do	my	best	to	redress	the	former	and	own	the	latter	–	this	is	the	moral	grounding	of	solidarity.	That	intentive	consciousness	entails	annihilation	is	no	excuse,	but	rather	obliges	us	to	scrutinise	how	we	know,	what	that	discloses	of	the	world	and	with	what	implications.	This	article	explores	the	possibilities	for	solidarity	afforded	by	affective	mediated	experience,	a	‘phatic’	(Frosh,	2011)	relation	of	mere-
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feltness	to	others.	Its	conclusion	is	not	that	it	is	better	to	feel	than	to	know,	but	rather	that	the	intuitive,	distracted	and	ambivalent	experience	of	others	over	time	–	as	Frosh	(2011:	384)	puts	it,	 impersonal,	non-intimate	and	inattentive	aspects	of	mediation	–	may	be	more	conducive	to	subjective	recognition	than	intense	moments	of	focus,	concentration	and	cogitation.		In	recent	political	and	media	theory	(Honneth	&	Fraser,	2003;	McNay,	2008)	the	idea	of	affective	solidarity	has	been	regarded	as	something	of	a	contradiction	in	terms.	Any	relation	to	the	other	consisting	 in	 sympathy,	 sentiment	 or	 pity	 cannot	 form	 the	 basis	 of	 full,	 implicitly	 Hegelian,	subjective	recognition	of	the	other	–	and	in	practice	it	is	often	actively	dehumanising.	It	is	a	debate	with	much	deeper	roots,	going	back	to	Adam	Smith’s	conjecture	in	The	Theory	of	Moral	Sentiment	(1759)	that	the	key	to	recognition	of	mutual	humanity	is	imagination,	which	requires	more	than	reason	 alone	 to	 develop.	 While	 Rousseau	 (1758)	 warned	 that	 any	 attempt	 to	 imbue	representations	 of	 suffering	 with	 emotive	 force	 risks	 undermining	 that	 which	 it	 sets	 out	 to	achieve,	d’Alembert	responded	that	to	drily	recount	the	facts	of	human	misery	is	little	short	of	perverse	(see	Sennett,	1977).	More	recently	Luc	Boltanski	(1999)	has	challenged	the	idea	that	pity	is	necessarily	a	political	dead-end,	while	Charles	Taylor’s	(1992)	social	imaginaries	take	up	Smith’s	 arguments	 to	 investigate	 the	 kinds	 of	 spaces	 that	 afford	 the	possibility	 of	 individuals	imagining	their	way	into	the	lived	existence	of	others.		What	Boltanski	and	Taylor	have	in	common	is	the	belief	that	didacticism	does	not	work:	it	is	no	good	telling	people	they	should	care	more	or	care	differently	about	the	suffering	of	others.	This	goes	against	the	media	malaise	theorists	(see	especially	Moeller,	1999;	Sontag,	2003)	who	decry	the	 indifference	 exhibited	 by	 audiences	when	 confronted	with	 the	worst	 of	 what	 people	 are	capable	of	doing	to	other	people	–	a	lament	that	goes	back	at	least	as	far	as	Proust	(1970	[1919]:	200).	But	whether	the	solution	to	perceived	cultures	of	apathy	and	fatalism	is	rubbing	the	public’s	noses	in	bloodshed	and	wretchedness	or	designing	(mediated)	spaces	in	which	people	can	think	their	 own	 way	 towards	 a	 more	 ethical	 relationship	 with	 the	 other,	 there	 is	 a	 common	presumption	that	what	is	required	is	rupture	–	a	breaking	through	of	habitual	ways	of	being	in	the	world	too	familiar	and	comfortable	to	allow	for	proper	recognition	of	what	is	going	on	in	the	world	and	how	others	experience	 it.	Against	 that	conventional	wisdom,	 then,	and	 in	 line	with	Frosh’s	diagnosis	of	 an	 ‘attentive	 fallacy’	 (2011:	385)	underpinning	 it,	 this	 article	 argues	 that	solidarity	with	distant	others	is	not	clinched	in	critical	moments	in	spite	of	the	affective	swim	that	characterises	so	much	of	everyday	life,	but	precisely	through	that	quotidian	experience,	with	all	its	attendant	sensations,	distractions	and	feelings.			
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Levinas	on	duration	as	non-intentional	consciousness		In	“Ethics	as	First	Philosophy”	(1989	[1961]),	Levinas	explores	the	tension	between	the	fact	that	in	 everyday	 life	 it	 is	 simply	 impossible	 to	 take	everything	 in	–	physiological	 stimuli,	 let	 alone	complex	political	realities	–	and	the	instinctive	responsibility	many	feel	to	know	one’s	place	in	the	world	as	best	as	one	can.	Thrownness	is	an	experience	of	profound	disorientation,	to	which	the	 natural	 response	 is	 to	 grasp	 towards	 orientation	 by	 whatever	 means	 are	 to	 hand:	 in	Heidegger’s	 (1962	[1927])	words,	we	exist	 findingly	 [befindlich].	This	appears	self-interested,	especially	 as	 the	 inclination	 towards	 orientation	 tends	 over	 time	 to	 solidify	 into	 comforting	rituals	of	continuity,	but	taken	at	first	principles	it	need	not	be.	For	Levinas	the	principle	of	taking	responsibility	for	the	self	relies	on	its	displacement	from	the	centre	of	philosophical	investigation	(Pinchevski,	2012:	349).	The	notion	of	the	self	as	something	into	which	we	are	thrown	rather	than	something	that	comes	from	within	us,	derives	from	the	claim	that	existing	is	ontologically	prior	to	the	existent.	All	this	means	is	that	existence	does	not	start	from	some	primal	origin	and	then	goes	about	existing	 in	different	ways	 in	the	world:	we	begin	with	ways	of	existing	 in	the	world	with	others	and	only	come	to	understand	the	idea	of	existence	as	a	self	over	time.	Taking	ownership	of	our	relationality,	those	modes	of	existing	that	have	no	prior	existent,	is	the	key	to	becoming	an	autonomous	subject.		In	everyday	contexts	such	as	catching	up	with	the	news,	though,	it	can	be	profoundly	annoying	that	 we	 cannot	 help	 but	 find	 ourselves	 engaging	 in	 acts	 of	 selfhood,	 incorporating	 the	objectification	of	others,	which	we	are	then	judged	or	judge	ourselves	upon.	“Just	own	it”	sets	a	high	bar	which,	realistically,	most	of	us	will	 fail	 to	clear	most	of	the	time.	There	is,	 though,	an	alternative	 which	 does	 not	 resort	 to	 a	 rationalisation	 of	 indifference.	 This	 is	 Sartre’s	 (2005	[1943])	non-positional	consciousness	of	the	self	that	sits	alongside	consciousness	of	something	else	–	think	of	the	latent	or	residual	sense	of	self	you	have	when	reading	a	book	or	watching	a	film,	 where	 the	 things	 you	 might	 be	 thoroughly	 engrossed	 in	 do	 not	 entirely	 displace	 your	embodied	sense	of	who	you	are.	While	normally	consciousness	is	acquisitive,	even	violent	in	its	demand	for	objects	to	be	identical	with	it,	non-positional	consciousness	is	more	tangential	–	and	could	lay	the	groundwork	for	a	less	complicit	ethics.		How?	First,	for	Levinas	this	is	not	ethics	arrived	at	through	knowledge.	Ethics	comes	first,	at	the	point	where	non-intentional	consciousness	is	thrown	into	a	world	before	it	is	knowable.	Ethics,	in	short,	consists	in	the	mere	fact	of	co-existence.	It	is	here	that	Levinas	and	Sartre	before	him	anticipate	the	“tune	in,	drop	out”	response	that	it	must	follow	that	to	live	ethically	is	to	live	with	as	little	consciousness	awareness	of	others,	still	less	understanding,	as	possible.	Sartre’s	response	
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is	emblematic	of	the	existentialist	school:	there	is	no	choice	to	not	choose,	all	choices	are	bad	yet	you	are	compelled	endlessly	to	make	them	until	death;	knowledge	is	a	curse	yet	ignorance	is	a	fantasy;	understanding	others	entails	you	acting	violently	towards	them	by	insisting	that	they	become	 objects	 of	 your	 consciousness,	 your	 empathy.	 This	 has	 been	 criticised	 variously	 as	romantic	and	nihilistic,	 and	 for	our	purposes	 it	 is	also	distinctly	 self-pitying	–	which	 is	not	 to	reduce	existentialism	to	the	indulgent	or	sophomoric	as	is	sometimes	seen	in	the	literature,	but	to	highlight	Sartre’s	focus	on	the	apparently	coherent,	reflective	self	undergoing	such	anguish.		Levinas,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 reframes	 Sartre’s	 claim	 about	 the	 impossibility	 of	 knowing	 and	communicating	with	others	as	a	promising	starting	point:	by	remaining	ungraspable,	the	other	“demands	acceptance	and	recognition	prior	to	any	comprehension	or	explanation”	(Pinchevski,	2012:	345).	The	logical	priority	of	thrownness	into	self-ing	before	any	notion	of	self-hood	means	that	 the	 ethical	 dilemma	 of	 one’s	 insuperable	 culpability	 does	 not	 arise	 through	 intentional	knowing;	 culpability	 is	 already	 there	 in	 one’s	 pre-reflexive	 relationality	 with	 others.	Understanding	that	non-intentive	relationality	may,	in	theory	at	least,	allow	for	a	reconception	of	other	 forms	 of	 consciousness	 that	 are	 potentially	 compatible	 with	 relations	 of	 solidarity,	including	the	merely	felt,	inappropriate	or	indifferent.	Specifically,	there	is	an	intimacy	to	the	non-intentional	which	stems	from	what	Levinas	dubs	‘pure	duration’	–	existing	with	another	over	time	in	such	a	way	that	each	may	act	on	the	other	without	appearing	as	an	object	to	 it.	 (By	way	of	analogy	Levinas	invokes	time	itself	as	a	force	which	acts	on	us	without	ever	appearing	as	an	object	of	 consciousness.)	 This	 pure	 duration	 is	 free	 of	 the	 will,	 implicit	 time	 which	 “no	 act	 of	remembrance,	reconstructing	the	past,	could	possibly	reverse”	(1989	[1961]:	81).	Implicit	time	signifies:	“other	than	as	knowledge	taken	on	the	run,	otherwise	than	a	way	of	presenting	presence…	being	 that	 dare	 not	 speak	 its	 name,	 being	 that	 dare	 not	 be;	 the	 agency	 of	 the	 instant	without	the	insistence	of	the	ego,	which	is	already	a	lapse	in	time	which	is	‘over	before	it’s	begun’!”	(ibid.)	As	a	form	of	relationality,	duration	is	embryonic,	but	it	is	not	innocent	–	“not	guilty,	but	accused”,	in	Levinas’	words,	“it	dreads	the	 insistence	in	the	return	to	the	self	 that	 is	a	necessary	part	of	identification”.		This,	 then,	 is	 distinct	 from	 the	 guilt-shaming	often	 implied	 in	 critiques	 of	 compassion	 fatigue	(Moeller,	 1999)	 or	mediated	 cultures	 of	 distraction	 (Virilio,	 2000),	 and	 to	which	many	 of	 us	subject	 ourselves,	 however	 counterproductively.	 It	 is	 accusatory,	 but	 not	 in	 Sontag’s	 (2003)	account	of	photography	 that	 forces	 the	viewer	 ‘finally’	 to	 realise	 the	death	and	destruction	 in	which	she	is	complicit.	It	is	an	accusation	that	emanates	from	our	pre-reflexive	sense	of	intimacy	
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over	time	–	from	being	in	the	world,	not	from	scrutiny,	demand	or	reflection.	This	can	sound	like	an	appeal	to	a	purer,	more	essential	form	of	relationality,	but	in	fact	it	amounts	to	the	opposite	as	it	does	away	altogether	with	any	metaphysical	conception	of	solidarity.	As	this	article	proceeds	it	will	become	clear	 that	 this	 is	where	the	practical	relevance	of	Levinas’	ethics	 lies.	There	 is	no	‘deep’	meaning	or	revelation	at	some	imagined	end	of	being	in	the	world	with	others,	nor	any	claim	 to	 reclaim	 an	 originary	 solidarity	 long	 since	 compromised	 by	 the	 depravities	 and	degradations	of	modern	life.	This	is	(co-)existing	as	logically	prior,	simply	what	we	find	ourselves	doing	all	the	time	out	of	necessity;	more	than	Heidegger’s	being-with-the-other,	it	is	being-for-the-other	(Pinchevski,	2012:	349).	And	 in	research	 into	media	and	 its	audiences,	 this	 frees	us	from	the	commitment	to	imagining	new	kinds	of	representation	or	mediated	experience	that	will	break	 through	 the	 fog	 of	 our	 overstimulated,	 commoditised	 everyday	 lives	 to	 clinch	 real	subjective	recognition	of	the	other.		The	following	section	sets	the	scene	for	this	shift	by	investigating	how	affective	postures	towards	the	world	represent	far	more	than	stunted,	merely-felt	relations	to	others	doomed	to	fall	far	short	of	solidarity.	To	round	out	this	section,	however,	three	points	bear	emphasising.	First,	and	most	obviously,	the	kind	of	intimate	non-intentional	consciousness	Levinas	has	in	mind	is	more	or	less	the	 antithesis	 of	 Buber’s	 I-Thou	 dyad	 (1937	 [1923]),	 predicated	 as	 it	 is	 on	 an	 unstinting,	unflinching	gaze	into	the	eyes	and	ideally	the	soul	of	the	other	(see	also	Pinchevski,	2012).	Second,	it	 is	not	a	rarefied	state	we	should	seek	to	attain:	 the	constant	experience	of	 thrownness	 into	always-already	existing	worlds	and	always-already	existing	selves	is	such	that	this	passive,	pre-reflexive	 relation	 to	 others	 is	 the	 default	 mode	 of	 existence	 –	 not	 a	 deviation	 from	 ‘true’,	objectifying	experience.	And	third,	 it	 is	categorically	not	sympathy,	as	it	 is	a	relation	not	to	an	imaginary	self-equivalent	but	precisely	to	an	other,	a	mystery.		
	
Disclosive	postures	of	being	in	the	world		Non-intentive	consciousness	 is	part	of	the	fabric	of	our	being	in	the	world,	 then,	but	 it	cannot	endure	in	the	face	of	our	constant,	if	ultimately	futile,	attempts	to	get	to	grips	with	that	world.	This	section	fleshes	out	the	possibilities	of	a	consciousness	that	is	positional	or	more	accurately	intentional,	but	in	a	way	that	is	felt	rather	than	reasoned	–	in	Jan	Slaby’s	(2016)	coinage,	affective	intentionality.	The	cogency	of	affective	intentionality	is	predicated	on	the	claim	that	a	principle	like	solidarity	is	not	something	internal	to	selfhood	which	we	then	go	and	wield	upon	the	world,	weighing	up	the	costs	and	implications	to	ourselves	but	making	commitments	regardless	because	that’s	who	we	are.	We	find	ourselves	acting	out	all	sorts	of	practices	of	existing	before	‘we’	exist,	
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so	any	principle	of	relationality	is	tied	up	in	those	encounters	we	navigate	as	best	we	can	through	improvisation,	learned	shortcuts	and	simply	how	we	feel.	But	how,	exactly,	is	what	someone	feels	disclosive	of	what	goes	on	in	the	world?	(Slaby,	2016:	1).	Conceptually,	feeling	is	a	dead-end	if	it	is	 treated	 deontologically	 –	 and	 this	 is	 seen	 empirically,	 too,	 in	much	 research	 following	 the	‘affective	turn’	that	simply	catalogues	feelings	as	though	to	probe	further	would	be	presumptuous	or	indeed	would	risk	switching	into	that	acquisitive	consciousness	that	is	thought	to	wreak	such	havoc.	As	much	as	affect	is	not	junk	data	or	evidence	of	an	insufficient	experience	of	others,	nor	is	it	sacrosanct;	for	while	it	is	experienced	as	something	distinctly	of	one’s	own,	often	in	corporeal	ways,	affect	is	also	collective	and	contextual.	Just	as	there	are	ways	of	being	in	the	world	which	precede	and	outlast	an	individual’s	existence,	there	are	ways	of	feeling	that	are	simultaneously	pre-reflexive,	ingenuous	and	materially	contingent	–	as	Lauren	Berlant	(2011:	53)	puts	it,	affect	is	“sensual	matter	that	is	elsewhere	to	sovereign	consciousness	but	that	has	historical	significance	in	 the	 domains	 of	 subjectivity”.	 Slaby	 frames	 this	 with	 reference	 to	 Deleuzean	 (1994)	assemblages,	and	also	to	Spinoza’s	account	of	the	pre-individual	sphere	of	becoming,	 in	which	affect	 can	 reasonably	 be	 located.	 Thus,	 affect	 is	 a	 relational	 unfolding	 within	 sociohistorical	settings	 that	 are	 themselves	 unfolding	 and	 enfolding;	 rather	 than	 being	 a	 structural	determination,	it	is	an	expression	of	relational	constellations	endemic	to	a	particular	place	and	time.	More	concretely,	Slaby	asks:	“How	do	subjects	of	experience	come	about	–	and	how	do	they	get	molded	and	transformed,	framed	and	policed	–	within	the	meshworks	of	the	socio-cultural	arrangements	that	make	up	our	contemporary	lifeworlds?”	(Slaby,	2016:	2)		The	 answer	 to	 this	 question,	 requiring	 as	 it	 does	 a	 balancing	 of	 individual	 experience	 and	contextual	 affective	 arrangements,	 lies	 in	 Katherine	 Withy’s	 (2014)	 concept	 of	 a	 disclosive	posture	–	or	as	earlier	generations	of	phenomenologists	would	have	described	it,	an	embodied	orientation	to	the	world	that	naturalises	the	relation	between	how	one	feels	about	it	and	what	is	informed	about	it.	As	with	Levinas,	a	disclosive	posture	is	an	ongoing	process	of	becoming,	one	of	insistently	present	formations	of	self	and	not	a	means	to	maintain	or	protect	an	already	existent	self.	Withy	starts	from	a	critique	of	Heidegger’s	distinction	between	cognitive	and	feeling	theories	of	emotion,	arguing	that	each	loses	sight	of	what	should	be	the	prize	target	of	analysis	–	pathé	understood	as	“ways	in	which	we	are	out	in	the	world,	immersed	and	involved	in	our	situation”	(Withy,	2014:	23).	Pathé	as	disclosive	postures	are	both	 the	ways	 in	which	we	 find	ourselves	situated	in	the	world,	hence	disclosive,	and	ways	of	being	situated	in	the	world,	hence	postures.			This	is	helpful	in	that	is	pushes	us	past	Heidegger’s	language	of	standing	in	a	situation,	with	all	its	emphasis	 on	 experiencing	 and	 representing	 and	 then	 by	 extension	 through	 chains	 of	 ethical	inference	 to	assessment,	 judgement	and	responsibility.	Posture	 indicates	 the	way	 that	 finding	
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ourselves	situated	means	finding	ourselves	already	in	the	thick	of	it,	immersed	in	the	world	and	not	detached	from	it.	The	work	that	affect	does	here	is	not	to	reduce	situatedness	to	how	we	feel	about	 a	 situation,	 but	 nor	 is	 it	 meant	 as	 a	 simple	 rejoinder	 to	mental	 calculation;	 instead	 it	attempts	to	capture	the	relational	orientation	of	embodied	being	with	regard	to	its	environment.	Slaby	 reminds	 us	 that	 this	 has	 much	 in	 common	 with	 Heidgger’s	 notion	 of	 findingness,	 but	whereas	 for	 Heidegger	 this	 refers	 to	 ways	 of	 aligning	 oneself	 with	 one’s	 surroundings,	 with	disclosive	postures	it	is	more	about	finding	oneself	in	alignment	–	or	indeed,	misalignment	–	with	constellations	of	people	and	things.	Previous	research	on	connection	and	disconnection	(Couldry,	Livingstone	&	Markham,	2007)	has	shown	that	an	 individual	at	a	given	point	 in	 time	 is	never	simply	connected	to	or	disconnected	from	the	world	around	them,	and	the	same	applies	here;	we	find	ourselves	in	resonance	with	our	surroundings	in	some	ways,	in	others	in	dissonance.	That	work	also	highlighted	 the	empirical	 risk	of	presuming	what	 the	experience	of	connection	and	disconnection	is	like,	and	likewise	here	it	is	sensible	when	thinking	about	designing	and	carrying	out	 empirical	 research	 to	be	open	 to	 the	possibility	 that	 alignment	might	 feel	otherwise	 than	secure,	and	misalignment	angst-ridden.		Disclosure	emphasises	that	finding	ourselves	situated	is	not	reducible	to	how	we	find	ourselves	feeling,	and	thrownness	incites	a	drive	not	just	to	know	ourselves	but	also	to	grasp	as	best	we	can	the	 reality	 of	 our	 situation.	 Awareness	 and	 understanding	 of	 the	 world,	 and	 not	 just	 our	knowledge	of	it	and	our	beliefs	about	it,	thus	come	into	play	–	if	only	as	possibilities	that	may	or	may	 not	 be	 realised.	 As	 Slaby	 puts	 it,	 “Disclosure	 names	 the	 entire	 dimension	 of	 a	 person’s	
potential	openness	to	the	world,	including	the	openness	to	what	is	in	fact	occluded,	and	also	the	openness	to	what	is	‘there’	but	nevertheless	beyond	one’s	grasp”	(2016:	5,	emphasis	in	original).	Heidegger	sees	disclosure	as	a	moral	responsibility,	not	just	something	we	find	ourselves	doing	but	something	which	we	are	bound	to	learn	how	to	do	well.	Levinas’s	innovation	is	to	recast	the	necessary	incompleteness	of	disclosure,	the	failure	of	communication,	as	a	precondition	of	moral	co-existence	rather	than	an	obstacle	to	it.	How	useful	it	is	for	philosophers,	political	scientists	and	media	scholars	to	judge	individuals	for	failing	to	disclose	the	world	‘well’	is	very	much	an	open	question,	 one	 I	 have	 previously	 answered	 (AUTHOR,	 2017)	 by	 underlining	 that	 whatever	someone	feels	about	their	duty	as	citizens	or	audiences,	the	condition	of	selfhood	as	unending	work	means	that	they	have	an	active,	always	unresolved	stake	in	how	that	self	appears	to	others	and	 thus	 to	 themselves	 that	 is	 likely	 to	 sustain	 an	 orientation	 towards	 understanding	 our	situation	at	 least	some	of	 the	 time.	But	 in	 that	work,	as	 for	Heidegger,	 failure,	distraction	and	ambivalence	are	the	default	settings	of	thrownness.	We	get	disclosure	wrong	most	of	the	time,	but	that	is	not	evidence	of	an	absence	of	a	habituated	orientation	towards	it.	As	Pinchevski	(2012:	
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356)	puts	it,	“[i]t	is	precisely	in	moments	of	uncertainty	and	in	instances	of	misunderstanding,	lack,	or	even	refusal	that	I	find	myself	facing	the	Other”.		Indeed,	to	follow	this	line	of	argument	further,	the	impossibility	of	awareness	and	understanding	actually	militates	against	indifference	and	fatalism,	simply	because	in	the	navigation	of	everyday	life	we	have	no	choice	but	to	be	aware	of	and	find	ways	to	live	with	the	fact	that	the	world	always	exceeds	our	awareness.	Willed	ignorance	is	one	option	for	existing	in	a	chaotically	demanding	world,	but	one	with	consequences	for	subjectification	which	is	not	thereby	halted	as	a	project.	We	have	no	choice	but	 to	subjectify,	 after	all.	This	 is	not	about	 the	consequences	of	 someone	deciding	not	to	try	to	understand	what	is	going	on	in	Syria,	but	deciding	instead	to	live	as	though	one’s	thoughts	and	feelings	have	no	causal	correlate	in	the	world.	That	is	an	impossibility	over	time,	as	Levinas’	duration	tries	to	elucidate,	and	this	means	that	we	do	not	have	to	go	so	far	as	Heidegger	in	insisting	that	full	awareness	and	understanding	are	moral	imperatives	–	awareness	and	 understanding	may	 be	 patchy	 and	 inconsistent	 in	 practice,	 but	 they	 are	 what	 make	 life	liveable	at	the	sharp	end	of	ordinary	existence,	and	they	are	how	others	become	liveable-with	(Frosh,	2011:	389).	To	refract	this	through	the	lens	of	affect,	we	are	always	aligned	to	an	‘always	more’	that	affects	us	in	ways	we	do	not	and	cannot	fully	apprehend;	this	is	what	Levinas	terms	the	 interruption	 of	 the	 Said	 by	 the	 Saying.	 This	 is	 what	 clinches	 the	 status	 of	 affect	 as	 an	epistemological	 object	 fit	 for	 media	 and	 political	 theory.	 Affective	 experience	 means	 to	 find	oneself	situated	in	an	ongoing	situation	that	has	stakes,	in	the	midst	of	affective	arrangements	that	are	available	to	us	yet	exceed	our	cognitive	apprehension	and	practical	grasp.	Thus,	Frosh	argues,	 “[i]f	 most	 individual	 strangers	 on	 television	 are	 viewed	 indifferently,	 in	 routine,	unremarkable,	non-hostile	encounters,	then	their	constant	and	cumulative	presence	within	the	home	is	a	significant	historical	accomplishment”	(2011:	393).		There	 is	 an	 apparent	 tension	 between	 Levinas’	 non-intentional	 consciousness	 and	 disclosive	posture	in	that,	while	each	operates	at	the	level	of	the	pre-reflective,	the	former	appears	seminally	and	enthusiastically	open,	the	latter	compromised	and	more	geared	towards	coping.	On	the	moral	plane	it	bears	emphasising,	though,	that	non-intentional	consciousness	has	culpability	baked	into	it	from	the	outset.	And	in	less	freighted	phenomenological	terms,	it	too	shares	the	premise	that	there	 is	 no	 such	 consciousness	 that	 simply	 exists	 and	 then	 goes	 about	 looking	 for	 others	 to	recognise	without	objectifying	–	 it,	 like	 the	disclosive	posture,	always	 finds	 itself	existing.	For	both,	there	is	no	possibility	of	reasoning	our	way	through	to	best	practice	from	first	principles,	and	for	us	that	means	that	it	is	untenable	to	think	our	way	from	an	ideal	conception	of	solidarity	to	the	kind	of	(media)	practices	we	would	like	to	see	in	the	world.	What	we	have	are	already-existing	ways	of	being	in	the	world	–	ways	that	can	be	compared	and	judged,	though	not	held	up	
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against	 abstractions	 free	 of	 the	 insistence	 of	 being.	 How,	 then,	 do	 we	 deal	 with	 the	 casual	observation	 that	 so	much	 of	 how	 people	 respond	 emotionally	 to	 what	 they	 see	 in	 the	 news	appears	 ersatz,	 imitative	 and	 predictable?	 It	 is	 a	 question	 that	 cannot	 be	 avoided	 if	 the	phenomenology	of	 affect	 is	 to	 transcend	 the	merely	descriptive	 to	get	 at	 the	authenticity	and	inauthenticity	that	characterises	different	ways	of	being	in	the	world.		For	starters	it	helps	to	move	beyond	the	expectation	we	sometimes	have	in	our	more	judgemental	moods	that	people	should	consistently	own	their	thrownness	into	a	mediated	relationality	with	suffering	others.	We	have	seen	here	that	affect	precedes	individuation,	a	repertoire	of	reactions	that	exceed	us	but	which	we	internalise	as	how	we	personally	feel	–	it	is	a	shared	resource	that	necessitates	 affective	 cultures.	 The	 same	 is	 true	 of	 Levinas’	 pre-reflective	 consciousness:	 it	 is	hardly	 formless,	 instead	 always-already	 shaped	 by	 familiar	 arrangements	 of	 stimuli	 and	 the	comportments	associated	with	them.	Without	such	arrangements	to	hand,	responding	at	the	local	level	is	impossible.	In	conceptual	terms,	they	follow	logically	from	existence	postulated	as	nothing	more	and	nothing	less	than	ways	of	being	in	the	world.	If	people’s	affective	responses	seem	like	second-hand	patellar	reflexes	–	“The	body	weeps	when	it	mimics	grief”,	in	Bourdieu’s	mordant	phrase	 (1990:	 73)	 –	 then	 so	 be	 it:	 perhaps	 a	 well-calibrated	 disclosive	 posture	 that	 makes	knowing	how	to	respond	to	tragedy	and	injustice	the	most	natural	thing	in	the	world	is	precisely	the	pre-condition	of	the	autonomous,	yet	situated	and	relationally	constituted	subject.		There	is	a	rich	tradition	in	the	literature	after	all	of	conceiving	of	all	human	behaviour,	including	encounters	with	others,	as	essentially	performative	or	mimetic.	For	Goffman	(1959;	1963)	our	microscopic	 responses,	 certainly	 including	 the	 affective,	 in	 all	manner	of	 situations	 are	 about	scripts	mastered	to	indicate	social	competence	and	collectively	to	achieve	the	‘civil	inattention’	that	makes	social	spaces	liveable.	This	is	not	intended	as	derision,	either	–	for	Goffman	there	is	no	authentic	self	to	be	revealed	once	all	the	learned	performance	has	been	stripped	away;	we	are,	in	effect,	all	surface,	all	script.	For	Foucault	(1990	[1976])	as	for	Butler	(1997)	those	self-same	responses	are	more	a	matter	of	incitement	than	mastery,	the	myriad	intimate	ways	we	submit	to	disciplinary	regimes	of	power.	But	for	both,	again,	there	is	no	ontologically	prior	self	doing	the	submitting,	 only	 the	 self	 constituted	 in	 acts	 of	 submission.	 Performance	models,	 perhaps	 less	figuratively	described	as	contextual	response	templates,	are	perfectly	compatible	with	notions	of	authenticity,	 however,	 and	 evidence	 of	 a	 performance	 ritual	 is	 not	 in	 itself	 an	 indication	 of	inauthenticity.	Similarly,	authenticity	is	not	predicated	on	the	existence	of	a	consistent	self,	since	it	is	in	discontinuously	coherent,	grasping	acts	of	selfhood	that	fail	to	grasp	the	other	that	we	are	most	likely	to	find	the	kinds	of	authentic	bearing	unto	the	world	upon	which	solidarity	as	a	lived	principle	is	possible.	
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	None	of	this	is	to	suggest	that	we	should	content	ourselves	with	whatever	scraps	of	affect	we	can	lay	our	hands	on	as	proof	that	there	is	still	residual	empathy	in	the	contemporary	world	(Frosh,	2011:	 387),	 rather	 than	 the	 tritely	 sentimental	 or	 virtue-signalling	 that	 much	 of	 it	 seems	 to	represent,	or	that	we	should	give	up	on	trying	to	imagine	and	create	spaces	in	which	new	kinds	of	 relations	 between	distant	 others	 can	 crystallise.	 Indeed,	 the	 aim	 is	 to	 posit	 that	 affect,	 the	merely-felt,	may	present	the	most	fertile	ground	for	thinking	differently	and	progressively	about	solidarity.	 Previous	 research	 (AUTHOR,	 2017)	 focussed	 on	 professional	 cultures	 of	 media	production,	workers	who	 in	 this	 context	might	be	 thought	of	as	 in	 the	business	of	promoting	solidarity,	but	the	point	still	stands:	whatever	political	principles	they	claimed	were	instantiated	not	in	spite	of	the	affective	distractions	of	everyday	life,	but	precisely	through	them.	This	is	in	part	about	the	tension	between	a	sense	of	self	already	signed	up	to	a	particular	commitment	and	the	slog	 of	 repetitive	 labour	 performed	 in	 compromised	 and	 compromising	 ways;	 it	 is	 that	ambivalent	mode	of	being	in	the	world	that	allows	for	something	like	non-intentional	duration	with	the	other.	The	apparently	mundane	experience	of	busyness	is	not	about	all	of	the	competing	demands	 on	 your	 attention	 and	 time	 that	 stop	 you	 doing	 the	 important	 stuff:	 that	 sense	 of	incessant	 activity	 is	 what	 affords	 a	 partially	 non-directional	 relation	 to	 work’s	 other	 that	 is	conceivably	more	substantive	and	more	sustainable	over	time.	Similarly,	happy	camaraderie	at	work	 is	not	a	by-product	of	 coming	 together	with	 like-minded,	principled	others;	 instead,	 the	affective	pleasures	of	repetitive	everyday	socialising	allow	for	the	instantiation	of	a	sensed,	not	clinched,	ethical	relation	to	the	suffering	others	who	form	the	stuff	of	the	professional’s	work.	And	the	rhythmic	ego-rush	of	self-satisfaction	that	comes	with	audiences	liking	and	sharing	one’s	work	on	social	media	–	as	well	as	the	visceral	thrill	of	duelling	with	the	haters	–	do	not	get	in	the	way	of	 one’s	 fellow-feeling	with	 suffering	others,	 but	 rather	 enable	 it	 to	 coalesce	 and	 sustain	across	time	in	a	more	meaningful	manner	than	pious	platitudes.	What	remains	to	be	resolved	is	exactly	what	kind	of	relationality	this	amounts	to,	and	whether	the	same	provisional	paths	from	affect	to	solidarity	might	apply,	however	haltingly,	to	audiences	and	publics	more	broadly.		
	
Felt	awareness	and	affective	solidarity		The	 subtlety	 of	 Levinas’	 position	 tends	 to	 be	 occluded	 by	 some	 fairly	 normative	 language:	duration	as	a	‘pure’	state	unsullied	by	the	insistence	of	the	ego,	or	of	an	idealised	subject	‘afraid’	or	‘dreading’	its	interpellation	as	someone	actively	attending	to	and	trying	to	make	sense	of	the	other	 ‘at	 point	 blank’.	 The	 same	might	 be	 said	 of	what	 it	means	 to	 grasp	 the	 ‘nakedness	 and	destitution’	of	the	other’s	face,	but	there	is	a	point	worth	holding	onto	about	what	is	recognised	
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in	the	other	prior	to	any	particular	expression	of	their	part	–	that	is,	their	expressivity.	The	riper	language	suggests	an	elevation	of	immediacy,	which	elsewhere	is	not	at	all	the	point	of	duration;	similarly,	 ‘prior’	 in	 these	 more	 rhetorical	 passages	 has	 a	 distinctly	 temporal	 tinge,	 where	elsewhere	 it	 is	 unequivocally	meant	 in	 the	 strictly	 logical	 sense.	 Cleaving	 to	 duration	 not	 as	originary	and	immediate	but	as	simultaneous	and	variously	mediated	opens	up	the	possibility	of	a	sense	of	the	other	as	a	kind	of	background	hum	that	sits	amongst	all	the	other	sense-perceptions	one	has	an	any	moment	in	time,	the	analogue	of	Sartre’s	residual	sense	of	self	that	accompanies	all	 acts	 of	 attending.	 Frosh	 likewise	 shines	 a	 light	 on	 audience	 inattention	 not	 as	 a	 political	deficiency,	but	as	something	which	can	sustain	connectivity	through	the	cumulative	experience	of	myriad	phatic,	affective	or	indifferent	encounters	with	distant	others.		Levinas’	reservations	about	the	bull-in-a-china-shop	tendencies	of	the	grasping,	curious	subject	are	well	founded,	but	it	does	not	follow	that	duration	needs	to	be	protected	from	all	modes	of	awareness	of	the	other.	The	intense	glare	of	a	subject	determined	to	see	and	apprehend	may	well	inflict	 violence;	 the	 ambivalent,	 provisional	 feltness	 of	 others,	 embedded	 among	 all	 the	 other	experiences	of	thrownness,	offers	something	different.	Again,	this	is	not	to	value	feeling	the	other	above	knowing	them	–	the	two	are	not	mutually	exclusive,	after	all.	But	it	is	worth	exploring	the	possibilities	of	the	kind	of	attention	that	tends	to	be	paid	in	everyday	life:	temporally	finite,	maybe	task-related,	always	interspersed	with	all	manner	of	other	experiences,	and	with	periods,	perhaps	even	most	of	the	time,	where	the	other	withdraws	to	the	merely	sensorily	ambient.	If	this	holds	water,	it	would	serve	as	a	corrective	to	the	underlying	assumptions	of	much	academic	writing,	as	well	as	photojournalism,	war	reporting	and	humanitarian	campaigning,	that	the	affective	drone	of	everyday	life	is	exactly	what	needs	to	be	ruptured.	Instead	of	forever	insisting	on	the	presence	of	 the	other,	 it	 contends	 that	 the	withdrawal	of	 the	other	back	 into	quotidian	affect	 is	 just	 as	important:	 this	 is	what	 constitutes	 the	other’s	 excess,	 an	 excess	which	 interrupts	 rather	 than	disrupts.	On	the	part	of	the	subject,	it	fits	better	with	a	conception	of	thrownness	not	as	something	which	begins	with	nothing	and	then	gradually	takes	form,	leaving	space	for	some	radically	other	kind	 of	 experience	 in	 between,	 but	 as	 always-already	 shaped	 by	 ways	 of	 experiencing,	 by	disclosive	postures.			The	upshot	is	that	feeling	the	right	way	about	the	other	–	the	kind	of	way	that	we	imagine	might	be	 most	 appropriate	 to	 affording	 subjective	 recognition	 –	 might	 just	 be	 immaterial.	 Feeling	indifferent,	irritated,	sentimental,	piteous	or	self-righteous	about	a	suffering	distant	other	could	well	be	compatible	with	a	long-term	relation	of	solidarity	with	them.	In	fact,	I	would	want	to	go	further	to	suggest	that	maybe	certain	of	these	feelings	are	counter-intuitively	conducive	towards	such	a	relation.	There	may	be	no	reason	to	assume	that	this	is	the	case,	but	the	truth	is	that	we	do	
 13 
not	know.	Solidarity	cannot	be	abstracted	from	the	affective	experience	of	everyday	life,	and	there	is	no	apprehension	of	the	other	prior	to	our	sensing	and	feeling	it.	There	is,	however,	space	for	a	non-destructive,	 non-acquisitional,	 non-identity-insisting	 consciousness	 of	 the	 other	 which	intermittently	senses,	feels	and	knows	and	whose	relation	to	that	other	cannot	be	derived	merely	logically.	By	way	of	analogy,	consider	the	irreverent	humour	of	the	surgeon	or	the	outrageously	distasteful	jokes	shared	between	war	reporters:	we	tend	to	think	of	these	as	coping	mechanisms,	or	perhaps	of	behavioural	displays	of	professional	competence,	but	might	they	not	also,	against	the	grain,	be	what	ground	a	relation	of	empathy	to	the	others	of	their	work?	The	failure	to	attend	and	 feel	 appropriately	 by	 professionals	 is	 sometimes	 criticised	 and	 sometimes	 excused	 as	understandable,	but	if	we	take	Levinas	seriously	–	and	here	he	is	in	accord	with	de	Beauvoir	–	then	those	failures	may	be	the	rub	of	it:		 Therefore,	in	the	very	condition	of	man	there	enters	the	possibility	of	not	fulfilling	this	condition.	In	order	to	fulfil	it	he	must	assume	himself	as	a	being	who	“makes	himself	a	lack	of	being	so	that	there	might	be	being.”	But	the	trick	of	dishonesty	permits	stopping	at	any	moment	whatsoever.	One	may	hesitate	to	make	oneself	a	lack	of	being,	one	may	withdraw	before	existence,	or	one	may	falsely	assert	oneself	as	being,	or	assert	oneself	as	nothingness.	One	may	realise	his	freedom	only	as	an	abstract	independence,	or,	on	the	contrary,	reject	with	despair	the	distance	which	separates	us	from	being.	All	errors	are	possible	since	man	is	a	negativity,	and	they	are	motivated	by	the	anguish	he	feels	in	the	face	of	his	freedom.	Concretely,	men	slide	incoherently	from	one	attitude	to	another.	(de	Beauvoir,	1948:	35)			
Next	steps:	investigating	residual	affective	ways	of	being		All	 those	 responses	 to	 mediated	 suffering	 we	 tend	 to	 think	 of	 as	 falling	 short	 of	 subjective	recognition	in	the	short-term	and	solidarity	across	the	long	–	messy,	hard-to-categorise	reactions	encompassing	 sentimentality	 but	 also	 irony,	 snark,	 virtue	 signalling,	 turning	 away	 and	 facing	away	–	are	properly	understood	as	affect	insofar	as	however	we	might	come	to	rationalise	them	to	 ourselves	 and	 to	 others,	 they	 intuitively	 feel	 simultaneously	 distinctive	 and	 familiar.	 That	makes	them	functional	in	the	phenomenological	sense	of	maintaining	continuity	in	the	world	we	inhabit	and	in	the	sense	of	self.	But	the	reverse	is	also	true:	affect	is	precisely	that	which	alerts	us	to	interruption	–	again,	both	in	the	world	around	us	and	in	our	intuitive	sense	of	who	we	are.	What	 might	 appear	 on	 the	 face	 of	 it	 to	 be	 the	 opportunistic,	 kneejerk	 appropriation	 of	 the	suffering	of	others	in	the	service	of	existential	comfort	–	reassuring	us	that	life,	and	we,	continue	
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today	pretty	much	as	it	and	we	did	yesterday	–	can	also	be	read	as	a	reaction	to	the	sensation	of	discontinuity.	We	intuit	ways	of	being	in	the	world	but	are	always	projecting,	again	intuitively,	causality	 of	 how	 we	 feel	 to	 particular	 people	 and	 things.	 How	 we	 do	 so	 is	 a	 matter	 of	comportment,	 but	 each	 mode	 of	 postural	 response	 carries	 an	 element	 of	 non-intentional	consciousness	and	thus	intimate	duration.	In	short,	while	we	usually	think	of	scripted	affective	responses	as	evidence	of	a	lack	of	subjective	engagement,	this	instinctive	shorthand	may	provide	the	conditions	of	possibility	of	a	solidaristic	relation	to	the	other.		The	 question	 that	 immediately	 suggests	 itself	 is	 how	 can	 this	 be	 investigated.	 What	 is	 the	epistemological	basis	 for	establishing	how	pre-reflexive	ascriptions	of	causality	are	made	and	onto	what	nature	of	object?	Any	evidence	we	might	point	to	is	not	evidence	of	the	vulnerable,	authentic	 self	 we	 seek	 to	 conceal	 through	 our	 learned	 performances,	 nor	 of	 the	 thing	 itself	underlying	that	which	we	project	causality	onto.	And	it	 is	insufficient	just	to	demonstrate	that	people	 react	 affectively	 to	 suffering	 others	 and	 infer	 intimate	duration	 from	 that,	 as	 to	 do	 so	reveals	little	about	the	nature	of	the	relationship	and	how	it	might	metastasise	over	time	and	be	held	up	to	scrutiny.	The	answer	returns	us	to	ways	of	being,	of	shared	postures	in	given	contexts	or	affective	arrangements.	It	has	been	established	that	affect	is	a	pre-individual	mode	of	being,	something	 that	 precedes	 and	 outlasts	 any	 your	 or	 my	 experience	 of	 the	 world.	 Commonly-embodied,	 temporally	 durable	 templates	 of	 affective	 response	 could	 conceivably	 count	 as	evidence	 of	 the	 viability	 of	 solidarity	 between	 others	 in	 a	 given	 environment	 –	 and	 if	 such	templates	 still	 sound	 empirically	 elusive	 then	 they	 are	 no	 more	 so	 than	 Bourdieu’s	 habitus,	naturalised	 schema	 for	 being	 and	 doing	 in	 the	 world	 that	 are	 experienced	 as	 naturally	 as	breathing,	for	which	there	is	a	longstanding	tradition	of	empirical	research.		This	 kind	 of	 research	 could	 possibly	 appear	 mundanely	 descriptive	 of	 collective	 modes	 of	affective	response,	but	as	with	Bourdieu’s	framework	there	is	scope	also	for	explanation,	as	well	as	 judgement	 against	 principles	 of	 social	 good.	 The	 essential	 point	 is	 that	 solidarity	 is	 not	something	pure	that	is	realised	in	cheapened	though	potentially	effective	form	amid	the	rhythms	of	ordinary	experience	–	it	is	only	in	those	messy,	compromised	contexts	that	it	makes	sense	at	all.	Solidarity	is	not	inherently	eloquent	or	elegant	in	the	forms	it	takes,	which	depend	entirely	on	the	subjective	affordances	of	the	contexts	in	which	it	takes	root	or	not.	It	consists	not	in	spite	of	but	precisely	in	the	distracted,	conflicted,	discontinuous	practices	of	being	in	environments	that	demand	too	much	and	deliver	too	little,	that	insist	on	being	understood	while	forever	exceeding	our	 grasp.	 Instead	of	 stripping	 away	 the	 artifice	 in	 the	way	 that	 people	 respond	 to	mediated	others	in	banal	circumstances	to	find	out	what	really	motivates	their	behaviour,	it	is	instead	about	
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mapping	 out	 shared	 affective	 repertoires	 and	 asking	 what	 kinds	 of	 relationality	 these	 make	possible	over	time.		To	the	question	of	what	this	would	look	like	in	practice,	then,	the	strongest	answer	starts	with	a	negative:	not	 a	 catalogue	 of	whether	 individuals	 in	 a	 particular	 setting	 respond	 to,	 say,	 news	stories	about	natural	disasters	or	war	with	trite	sentiment,	an	off-colour	snide	remark	or	blithe	indifference.	The	reason	why	not	is	because	intersubjective	recognition	is	not	clinched	in	critical	encounters	but	the	spaces	in	between.	The	positive,	exploratory	response	is	to	ask:	what	kind	of	intuitive	relationality,	persists	when	a	distant	sufferer	withdraws	into	the	background	noise	of	everyday	life?	Is	withdrawal	nothing	more	than	an	absenting,	or	do	felt	traces	remain	of	a	durable,	excessive	object	which	might	sustain	a	sense	of	mutual	culpability,	and	perhaps	solidaristic	co-existence,	 over	 time?	 Just	 as	we	 can	 investigate	 the	 remainder	 of	 Scannell’s	 (1996)	 partially	implicated	selves,	everything	else	we	are	doing	as	we	pay	attention	to	this	or	that,	we	can	also	investigate	forms	of	being	in	the	world	with	others	manifest	in	inattention.	This	goes	against	the	grain	of	 some	more	apocalyptic	 readings	of	 the	kind	of	 interpellation	 insisted	upon	by	media	technologies	 –	 think	 of	 the	 Deleuzian	 accounts	 of	 selves	 “torn	 to	 pieces”	 by	 algorithms	 or	summoned	complete	and	unquestioning	by	the	neoliberal	 logics	that	underpin	our	technology	industries	(Lazzarato,	2014:	27).	But	interpellation	does	not	exceed	or	exhaust	the	self,	especially	if	that	self	is	conceived	as	always-already	ways	of	being	a	self	rather	than	something	more	primal.	And	attention	does	not	entail	interpellation,	for	the	simple	reason	that	attention	is	not	categorical,	something	switched	alternately	on	and	off.	It	is	fractured,	sometimes	scattergun,	reluctant,	absent	or	merely	ambient.	As	such	it	is	reasonable	to	enquire	into	what	else	selves	find	themselves	being	and	doing	 simultaneously	 or	 interspersed	with	 those	 critical	 encounters	with	 others	 that	 are	often	reified.	Likewise,	we	can	ask	what	remains	of	the	awareness	of	the	other	when	you	are	not	paying	attention	to	something	you	periodically	pay	attention	to,	and	then	to	track	over	time	what	kind	of	relationality	this	might	sustain.		This	article	does	not	presume	to	reveal	what	solidarity	looks	like	in	the	real	world,	only	that	it	is	likely	to	be	patchy,	perhaps	incoherent	and	characterised	by	a	distinct	absence	of	expressions	of	political	principle.	These	are	the	first	steps	towards	a	longer-term	project	to	take	seriously	not	just	what	solidarity	feels	like	in	everyday	life,	but	the	obverse:	what	kinds	of	feeling	in	everyday	life	afford	solidarity.	In	line	with	much	recent	literature	this	work	heeds	the	call	to	treat	affect	as	a	worthy	object	of	political	theoretical	inquiry,	but	also	proposes	a	shift	in	focus.	Normally	when	considering	affect	we	think	in	terms	of	how	particular	events	and	phenomena	make	people	feel,	and	with	what	 consequences	 –	 in	 particular,	 the	debate	 goes	 on	 as	 to	whether	 sentiment	 for	suffering	others	acts	as	a	bridge	to	cosmopolitan	engagement	or	a	roadblock.	Here,	though,	the	
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emphasis	is	on	looking	at	how	the	way	that	people	feel	in	a	less	focused,	more	dispersed	sense	shapes	 the	way	 they	relate	 to	objects,	 including	people,	 in	 the	world.	A	political	principle	 like	solidarity	is	not	demanded,	performed	and	recognised	in	discrete	encounters	but	embedded	in	a	disclosive	posture	or	bearing	onto	the	world,	ways	of	being	that	we	find	ourselves	thrown	into,	that	precede	us	yet	that	we	have	a	stake	in	claiming	ownership	of	and	responsibility	for.	Ways	of	being	 are	 generalised,	 and	 it	 follows	 that	 the	 relation	 we	 come	 to	 have	 with	 others	 is	 not	something	 forged	 in	 isolation,	 even	 if	 the	 experience	might	 feel	 like	 a	 solitary	 one.	Mediated	distant	 others	 are	 inevitably	 intermittently	 experienced,	 though	 in	 their	 withdrawals	 from	sensibility	as	well	as	consciousness	a	relationality	might	endure	that	precisely	through	its	lack	of	focus	and	directedness	affords	greater	recognition	over	time.	Not	all	affect	matters,	and	the	aim	must	be	 to	distinguish	 feltness	 that	 is	politically	barren	and	 feltness	 that	nurtures	particular,	collective	 modes	 of	 relating	 over	 time.	 Empirically,	 though,	 there	 has	 to	 be	 a	 willingness	 to	explore	the	affective	interstices	–	not	just	moments	of	emotional	intensity	but	the	bits	in	between,	where	 the	merely-felt	may	 present	 a	way	 into	 understanding	 the	 conditions	 of	 possibility	 of	existing	politically.			
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